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 When the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) began its drive for 
Algerian independence, one of its first goals was to “internationalize the 
conflict”.1  It was a rather ironic objective considering the international system 
had provided the biggest impetus for revolution in Algeria in the first place.  
Revolutions are domestic in that they seek to alter the internal political, social, 
and economic structures of a territory and are preceded by discontent, agitation, 
and other internal factors.  However from the 19
th
 century and onward, it has 
become impossible for any state to exist in a vacuum.
2
  A state is in constant 
contact or dialogue, if you will, with the international system, an entity 
constituting all actors, states, ideologies, and events outside of a state.  
International events influence events within a state which may in turn influence 
the international system.  For that reason, the international system provides the 
single most important group of factors in the lead-up to a revolution: the context. 
 This paper will explore the significant role of the international system in 
creating the framework for revolution through the examination of three case 
studies: the Young Turk Revolution (1908), the Algerian Decolonization 
Movement (1954-1962), and the Iranian Revolution (1979).  Three factors of 
revolution will be studied: direct foreign involvement in a state, changes to the 
international opportunity structures, and the polarization of the international 
sphere.  Finally, some brief conclusions regarding the application of these 
structures to other Muslim Revolutions will be given. 
 The first and most evident incursion of the international system into a pre-
revolutionary state is through direct intervention by foreigners in the state‟s 
domestic affairs.  This involvement is sometimes military in nature, but more 
frequently takes the form of direct or indirect control of certain aspects of state 
sovereignty.  Although external in nature, this interference provokes extensive 
internal backlash within each state, thereby pushing them closer to revolution.  
For example, the Ottoman Empire suffered a debt crisis due to excessive spending 
on infrastructure and modernization in the years just before its revolution and 
threatened to default on its European sponsored loans.  Rather than allow the 
empire to default, France and Britain took over administration of the debt and 
supervision of economic affairs within the empire through the Public Debt 
Administration (1881).  This move naturally caused considerable internal anti-
European sentiment especially among the lower classes that bore the brunt of the 
                                                 
1
 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origin of 
the Post-Cold War Era, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), Print, 74 
2
 A state here will refer simply to the political organization of an area of land.  It therefore can 
refer to modern nation-states like France, Egypt, and Turkey but also to political entities such as 
the Ottoman Empire.  Additionally, although extensive scholarship has been devoted to studying 
the creation of the international system, its origins are beyond the scope and breadth of this paper. 
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high taxes and self-serving legislation imposed by the Europeans.
3
  The 
Europeans had also been propping up the “sick man of Europe” for decades 
through various techniques including monetary aid and military might to preserve 
the balance of power in the international system.  It was an effort that was 
becoming half-hearted and disjointed by the turn of the century, thereby 
destabilizing the empire further in preparation for revolutionary change.
4
 
 Algeria, as a French colony, on the other hand, was utterly consumed by 
the international system.  The lack of sovereignty and citizenship rights and the 
domestication practices of the colonists stimulated internal dissent.  Although 
Algeria was considered a “department” or province of France, the political, 
economic, and social privileges of that status were enjoyed chiefly by the noir 
(French colonists) and not the native population. The complete economic 
exploitation by France of Algeria, a periphery state in the world system, also 
fueled intense resentment and violent tendencies in the native population.
5
  
Economics was a central area of foreign intervention in Iran as well, albeit in a 
different way.  Iran accepted some foreign aid under the Shahs, especially to 
finance modernization projects.  However, the aid was frequently contingent on 
certain economic concessions, international alliances, employment of foreign 
advisors in economic and internal affairs, etc…  This allowed foreign actors, 
especially the U.S. and Soviet Union (U.S.S.R), to steal parts of Iranian 
sovereignty to serve their own cold war and economic interests.
6
  The strategic 
value of Iranian oil was also a considerable international concern.  Britain and the 
Soviet Union used this rationale to justify Operation Countenance, the full 
occupation of Iran‟s oil fields, railways, and other strategic infrastructure and 
interference in the Iranian political affairs during World War II.  Such concerns 
were also at play when Iran terminated oil agreements with the American-Iranian 
Oil Company in 1953 and attempted to nationalize the company.  Cold War 
politics and protection of strategic oil and economic resources were considered 
appropriate justification for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
coup d‟état to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq and install the U.S. 
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aligned Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi.  Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi would 
rule Iran with considerable U.S. support and financing until Iran‟s revolution in 
1979.
7
 
 In general foreign intervention in the Ottoman Empire, Algeria, and Iran 
siphoned the states‟ economic sovereignty into the hands of foreign governments 
and delegitimized domestic government officials as either the puppets of the 
international system or foreigners themselves.  These grievances, among many, 
made revolution an attractive option to many groups during these region‟s 
respective revolutions. 
 The smaller events and trends just mentioned are the embodiment and 
result of much larger scale transformations taking place in the international 
system.  Dramatic destabilization and change to power structures and actors such 
as those caused by World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) in many cases 
made the international system more conducive to the outbreak of revolutions in 
particular states.  For instance, the Young Turk revolution took place during a 
“wave” of revolutions during the early 20th century.  The Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP), a Young Turk revolutionary organization, most certainly drew 
inspiration and tactics from similar constitutional revolutions such as the Japanese 
Meiji Restoration, the Russian Revolution of 1905, and the Iranian Revolution of 
1906.
8
  For example, Sati al-Husri (2006), a civil servant in the Ottoman Empire, 
made the statement that, “from now on, the „history of Japanese progress‟ will 
show us with great clarity what kind of course of action it is necessary for us to 
pursue for „true progress,‟” and that, “however backward a nation may remain in 
the matter of progress, if it shows a sufficient level of earnestness, … it will be 
able to make good the time that it has lost.”9  Successful constitutional revolutions 
in other states encouraged the CUP to believe that political change was possible 
and perhaps even inevitable within their own state. 
 In contrast, Algeria‟s revolution emerged out of the rebuilding of the 
international system post-WWII.  The late 1940‟s were a period of reinvention 
and rebuilding of national and state identities, particularly in formerly German-
occupied-territories such as France.    French political and economic hegemony 
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 Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, Updated Ed, (New Haven, CT: 
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and sense of legitimacy was weak over all its colonies, including Algeria during 
this time.  Given the instability and anticipation of change that this post-WWII 
environment engendered, it was only natural that the FLN saw these conditions as 
a window of opportunity in which to execute their revolution.  Additionally, 
Algeria also had the company of a wave of other decolonization movements in 
other colonies.  These including its French-occupied neighbors Morocco and 
Tunisia, and the breakup of the European-controlled Mandate states in the Middle 
East into free nation-states following WWII.  The Bandung Conference, a 
meeting of developing nations and colonies who wished to remain “unaligned” 
with either the United States or Soviet Union during the Cold War, presented 
additional openings.  The FLN was able to develop friendships with countries less 
dependent on Cold War politics for survival, such as Egypt, at the conference.
10
  
Algeria took advantage of the international opportunities offered by the new 
international system, along with the fear and sympathies that existed in western 
nations still recovering from the calamity that was WWII, to launch its battle for 
domestic independence and international solidarity with its colonial compatriots. 
 Because the Iranian Revolution occurred about two decades after most 
other Muslim revolutions, it was much more dependent on the Cold War 
international structure and its reactionary movements than its predecessors.  After 
20 years of American or Soviet style development and the inherent secularization 
policies that came with each, many Muslim states were disillusioned with 
Western policies of development in general.
11
  This triggered an Islamic 
resurgence in many states including Iran that incorporated narratives of a return to 
the “true way” and the reassertion of Islam in political life.  This international 
system shift, along with an internal economic recession within Iran, provided an 
opportune environment for the Iranians to launch their revolution against the Cold 
War system, the corrupting influences of the west, and western modernization 
policies.
12
  Some scholars have gone so far as to call the Iranian Revolution a 
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“clash of civilizations”, between East and West, tradition and modernity, Islam 
and Christianity. 
 Yet this brings up an interesting, but little talked about phenomenon in the 
international system and revolution: the polarization and re-polarization of 
identities within the system.  Normally, one thinks about identities as a pair, one 
representing a particular viewpoint and understanding of the world system and the 
second, an “other” identity with different and “foreign” viewpoints from the 
former.  In everyday life, the identity and its “others” are in constant flux, 
“continually being constructed and reconstructed through interaction with one 
another.”13  However, at some times two identities may become “polarized” and 
perceive one another as antagonistic and a threat. As mentioned previously, this 
happened with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. identities during the cold war, creating a 
bipolar and tension-wrought international system that was partially conducive to 
revolution.
14
  However there are two other identity system struggles that were 
strong factors in this paper‟s three case studies, and many other Muslim 
revolutions as well. 
 The first was the colonial identity system, a structure that Frantz Fanon 
(2004) described as a “world divided in two.”15 The worldview was centered on 
the division of individuals into colonist and native, oppressor and oppressed.  
Colonists saw the native “other” as backward, colored, evil heathens needing 
western tutelage. On the other hand, the native saw the colonist “other” as violent, 
oppressive, threatening to his/her religion and culture, etc….  This system waxed 
in the late 19
th
 century with the mad colonial scramble for Africa by the European 
powers.  The identity system waned during the World Wars when Allied and Axis 
identities and conflict were of more importance than colonial issues.  Its salience, 
though, increased dramatically in the years following WWII, especially when 
decolonization was more prevalent. In the Algerian case and in the colonized 
world more generally, “otherhood” constituted threat and virulent hatred.  If 
Frantz Fanon claims are accurate, violence was not only inevitable but necessary 
to destroy the polarized system.
16
  Whatever the truth of his assertion, the 
polarization of colonial identity in the international system was vital to creating a 
physical and mental enemy which could be fought against. 
                                                 
13
 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics," International Organization 46,2 1992, Web, 2 Mar 2010, JSTOR, Retrieved at 
Macalester College, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858,  391-425 
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 The second system, what I will term the haves and have-nots system, is 
more economic and development based. As Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1997), an 
ideologue of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, describes in his book Gharbzadegi 
(Weststruckness), the international sphere is divided into two groups, Europe and 
the West or: those with full stomachs and power, and Iran and the rest of the 
world who go hungry and are powerless.
17
  While this description fits the 
disillusionment with modern development mindset of pre-revolutionary Iran, it 
also can apply to the Young Turk Revolution.  As mentioned previously, Ottoman 
territories had enormous debts to western powers leaving the empire poverty 
stricken and militarily inferior while the west was rich, modern, and powerful.  In 
most Muslim revolutions of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century, there is always a divide; 
there is an “us” which is good, civilized, and superior, and a “them” or “other” 
which is an enemy of the people and a threat to the survival of the Muslim state.
18
 
 In the age of globalization, the line between what is local and what is 
international has been blurred beyond recognition.  Yet as this study shows, the 
border between the international system and the domestic state has been an 
obscure yet high activity site in the period leading up to a revolution.   The 
pilfering of sovereignty, whether through direct colonization, foreign aid decrees, 
or developmental “assistance” was a pungent theme across the Young Turk 
Revolution, Algerian Decolonization, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979.  But 
even more than these small intrusions, changes to the international structure 
bestowed unique and unforeseen opportunities on the revolutionaries.  
Polarizations of identity allow revolutions to congeal around common themes, 
identities, and enemies even as it heightens tension within the international 
system.  Although internal factors are important in determining the grievances and 
structure of a revolution, it is the international system that gives a Muslim 
revolution its passionate willpower, and the “it's us or it's them” mentality and 
determine the perfect time in which to strike.  It‟s not a few zealous Islamic 
fundamentalists that diplomats should be worrying about.  It‟s the fact that 
“wealth and poverty, power and impotence, knowledge and ignorance, prosperity 
and desolation, and civilization and savagery have become polarized in the 
world.”19 
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  It‟s not a question of if but of when and to whom the international system 
will award its favor and who will be the next target.  Revolution and the 
international system can be a dangerous combination. 
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